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The Role of Recognition in Kelsen’s Account of Legal Obligation
and Political Duty
David Ingram
Loyola University Chicago
dingram@luc.edu

Abstract
Kelsen’s critique of absolute sovereignty famously appeals to a basic norm of international recognition. However, in his discussion
of legal obligation, generally speaking, he notoriously rejects mutual recognition as having any normative consequence. I argue
that this apparent contradiction in Kelsen’s estimate regarding the normative force of recognition is resolved in his dynamic
account of the democratic generation of law. Democracy is embedded within a modern political ethos that obligates legal
subjects to recognize each other along four dimensions: as contractors whose mutually beneficial cooperation measures esteem
by fair standards of contribution; as autonomous agents endowed with equal rights; as friends who altruistically care for each
others’ welfare, and as fallible agents of diverse experiences and worldviews.
Keywords
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Die Rolle der Anerkennung in Kelsens Darstellung von Rechtspflicht und
politischer Pflicht
Zusammenfassung
Kelsens Kritik der absoluten Souveränität beruft sich bekanntlich auf eine Grundnorm internationaler Anerkennung. In seiner
Diskussion der Rechtspflicht lehnt er jedoch, allgemein gesagt, offenkundig ab, dass gegenseitige Anerkennung eine normative
Bedeutung hat. In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich, dass sich dieser scheinbare Widerspruch in Kelsens Ansatz betreffend
die normative Kraft der Anerkennung in seinem dynamischen Ansatz der demokratischen Rechtsetzung auflöst. Demokratie
ist eingebettet in ein modernes politisches Ethos, das Rechtssubjekte verpflichtet, einander entlang von vier Dimensionen
anzuerkennen: als Vertragsschließende, bei deren gegenseitig vorteilhafte Zusammenarbeit sich die Wertschätzung nach fairen
Standards des Beitrags bemisst; als gleichberechtige freie Menschen; als Freunde, die sich selbstlos um das Wohl des anderen
sorgen, und als fehlbare Akteure unterschiedlicher Erfahrungen und Weltanschauungen.
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1. Introduction
Contemporary debates about the ethics of recognition
(Honneth 1996; Taylor 1992; Ingram 2021) would seem to
be entirely foreign to Kelsen’s legal philosophy. I argue
that this impression is mistaken. Although Kelsen denies
that law can be founded on ethics, especially one based
on voluntary recognition of common interests (as social
contractarians would have it), he affirms the opposite
when writing about democracy. I contend that Kelsen’s
reflections on democracy ought to be considered more
central to his legal philosophy than they currently are.
Kelsen’s reference to recognition in this context must
in turn be distinguished from his discussion about the
importance of recognition in international and domestic
law, which refers to his idea of a basic norm.
In his discussion of legal obligation Kelsen
notoriously rejects mutual recognition as having any
normative consequence. The act of recognizing self
and other as sovereign agents enables persons (or
nations) to agree on terms of cooperation that are at
best prudentially – not normatively – binding. This kind
of social contractarian commitment to law is entirely
contingent on the voluntary consent of the contracting
parties, and so cannot independently obligate them –
each remains obligated only to itself. Kelsen’s solution
to this Hobbesian dilemma, viz., the impossibility of
deriving a normative obligation from a contingent
factual act of mutual recognition, postulates the
hypothetical assumption of a basic norm (Grundnorm)
which asserts that agreements ought to be kept. Not
mutual recognition of each agent’s sovereignty but
rather mutual recognition of a coercive norm that limits
everyone’s sovereignty according to law – what H.L.A.
Hart would later name “a rule of recognition” – must be
presupposed (Hart 1991).
I argue that Kelsen’s appeal to the role of recognition
in this latter argument at best explains how, from a
purely conceptual point of view (the point of view
adopted in Kelsen’s pure theory of law), legal subjects
identify (recognize) a law to which they are objectively
bound. The argument, in other words, does not purport
to explain why they in fact feel bound to it; accordingly, it
says nothing about how their intersubjective recognition
of others as people like themselves matters in this regard.
Kelsen himself notes that mutual recognition of the
law’s impact on one’s interests (to be safe from harm, to
gain the support of others, to avoid punishment, etc.) as
well as mutual recognition of the law’s impact on other
persons’ interests (to be treated with equal respect and
concern, to be treated fairly, etc.) are, like other socialpsychological observations about what motivates legal
subjects to comply with the law, far removed from a pure
theory of law, conceived as a theory of recognition. That
said, Kelsen’s own dissatisfaction with this latter theory,
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which arguably reflects conceptual tensions between its
static and dynamic aspects, which roughly correspond
to the standpoints of jurist and citizen, respectfully,
prompts me to turn to Kelsen’s social-psychological
observations about the political connection between
legal obligation and ethical recognition as a more fertile
ground of study.
For our purposes, the most salient of such
observations are contained in Kelsen’s practical writings
on liberal democracy, understood as the most likely
system to bring about a peaceful lawful order in a modern,
scientifically enlightened era. As he notes, democratic
procedures function best when those who apply them
do so in a civil manner that tacitly presupposes what
might be described as an ethos of mutual recognition. In
my opinion, such a combined political-legal account is
necessary to conceptualize our modern understanding
of legal authority in both its objective and subjective
dimensions.
I therefore argue that we must go beyond Kelsen’s
static account of law as a hierarchy of legal authorization
culminating in a constitution (the empirical
instantiation of a Kelsenian Grundnorm) and even
beyond his dynamic account of law as a self-authorizing
procedure underlying its own genesis. We must turn to
his political writings on democracy for appreciating the
kinds of moral principles modern constitutions must
embody if they are to secure the voluntary compliance of
minority groups with majority rule. In Kelsen’s account,
liberal democracy is the political system most capable
of securing stable legal functioning under modern
conditions of complex societal organization, moral
pluralism, scientific enlightenment, and individualism.
He insists that, in order to carry out this function well,
democracies must cultivate an ethos of civility which
encourages citizens to recognize each other as social
contractors who voluntarily cooperate for mutual
benefit under fair conditions. More precisely, it requires
them to recognize each other as autonomous agents
endowed with equal rights, as friends who care for each
other’s welfare, and as bearers of irreducibly diverse,
merit-worthy social interests and epistemically valuable
socio-cultural worldviews.

2. The Antinomies of Sovereignty and Recognition
in Kelsen’s Early Legal Theory
Kelsen’s early writings on international law provide
a convenient entry into our discussion of recognition
insofar as it appears at first glance to support the
very recognition-based account of legal authority
he so strenuously rejected in his pure theory of law.
Das Problem der Souveränität (1920a) argues against an
unqualified notion of national sovereignty by directly
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appealing to the logical necessity of international
recognition in determining which regimes count as
authorized representatives of independent legal orders.
In other words, it appears as if contractual agreement
among nations alone suffices to authorize the system of
treaties that make up international legal order, so that
only regimes that are admitted to this order by other
regimes in the global compact count as authorized
representatives of states. The same goes for a regime’s
monopoly of violence; it’s territorial scope also requires
international authorization facilitated by the voluntary
consent of other regimes.
In order to appreciate why Kelsen thinks this
recognition-based (social contractarian) view of
international law is incoherent, we need to recall an
argument he develops in his Reine Rechtslehre (1934):
According to the doctrine of recognition positive law is valid
only if it is recognized by the individuals subject to it, which
means: if these individuals agree that one ought to behave
according to the norms of positive law. This recognition, it
is said, actually takes place, and if this cannot be proved,
it is assumed, fictitiously, as tacit recognition. The theory
of recognition, consciously or unconsciously, presupposes
the ideal of individual liberty as self-determination, that
is, the norm that the individual ought to do only what he
wants to do. This is the basic norm of this theory (Kelsen
1967, 218n83).

Kelsen here states his logical objection to any idea of
sovereignty, or pure self-determination, understood
as a ground of obligation. The fact that several
governments or persons want something, recognize
this to be so, and therefore agree to it, as in the fiction of
the social contract, does not entail that they are entitled
(authorized or permitted) to want (recognize, agree to)
it. Will or collective might cannot constitute right. For
the social contractarian conception of legal validity
to get off the ground, logically speaking, some prior
basic norm authorizing or permitting each contractor
would have to be presupposed, such as “the individual
[government or person] ought to do only what he
wants (agrees) to do” (Kelsen 1967, 218n83). This “basic
norm”, however, is incoherent. Self-obligation (selfdetermination, self-legislation, self-authorization) are
but secular expressions of one and the same conflation
of will and norm, inherent in any political theology of
sovereignty. Normativity, by contrast, is objective, or
non-self-referential.
In his earlier discussion of international law, Kelsen
adduces a further objection to the idea that voluntary
recognition suffices to ground law. In the international
context, the idea presupposes a multiplicity of sovereign
governments that recognize each other. However, as
Kelsen notes, the idea of sovereignty works at cross

purposes to the idea of multiplicity, thereby rendering
superfluous any need for recognition. Indeed, Kelsen
argues that the idea of absolute national sovereignty
dialectically unfolds an imperialistic logic that
culminates in a world state.
Kelsen’s argument can be summarized accordingly:
Following the social contractarian view of international
recognition, legally self-determining and selfauthorizing governments are free to enter into treaties
– and break them – at will. Leaving aside the inherent
fragility of treaties based on pure will and national selfinterest, it is clear from the logical incoherence of selfauthorization noted above that the lawful status of any
agreement implies an authority beyond the contracting
parties capable of identifying and deciding that status –
in other words, something like a world state, or monistic
legal order having its authority grounded in some norm
(in a manner to be explained below), but not dependent
on recognition from another state.
Of course, governments can refuse to enter into
legally binding agreements – they can foreswear both a
higher law and mutual legal recognition. But it is hard to
imagine how this lawless state of nature among nations
could avoid the Hobbesian entailment of a single world
state. As Kelsen points out, a state of nature composed of
multiple sovereign states would be logically incoherent.
Because each state would interpret the legality of
any action affecting itself and other states from the
standpoint of its own legal system, it would have no
choice but to deny the sovereignty of all other states and regard its
own law as globally supreme (Kelsen 1920a, 45, 206).
Although Kelsen concedes the coherence of this kind
of legal monism (Kelsen 1920a, 129, 134), he notes that it
would logically entail an imperialistic power politics at
odds with the rule of law (Kelsen 1920a, 317). For a single
state to undertake an unauthorized extension of its legal
monopoly of violence over all other states would involve
unleashing a solipsistic will to power incompatible with
normativity (rightfulness) as such (Kelsen 1920a, 315, 317).
Although Kelsen admits that a world state established
through imperialistic means may become a recognized,
peace-keeping legal order of the kind he himself
endorses, at the moment of its willful imposition there
would be no independently recognized authority to
decide its legality.
Kelsen himself hoped that such a world state would
emerge through less violent means. Here, ironically,
he turns to the very social contractarian language he
elsewhere disparages, albeit with a significant twist.
International law can arise out of agreements among
nations that mutually recognize each other as free
and independent. All that is logically required is that
they abdicate their sovereignty. They must bend their
“wills” to the logic underlying their own rightful claim
to independence and concede that the authority binding
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their power to enter into binding agreements resides in a
basic norm: agreements must be kept (pacta sunt servanda)
(Kelsen 1989, 216).

3. The Antinomies of Kelsen’s Grundnorm:
Toward a Retrieval of Recognition as a Basis
for Political Duty
Kelsen concluded his treatise on the problem of
sovereignty with the admonition that “all political
striving must be put to the infinite task of realizing […] a
world state as a world organization” (Kelsen 1920a, 320;
my emphasis). In his opinion, only a single world state
(civitas maxima) organized democratically1 can guarantee
the rights of subordinate nations and their legal subjects
(Kelsen 1920a, 319). The sudden change in tone in
Kelsen’s text – from conceptual argument to political
prescription – brings us back to our political duty as
citizens of presumably peace-loving democracies
informed by an ethos of mutual recognition. However,
the path leading back to political recognition as an ethos
mandating the creation of a democratic world state
must begin where Kelsen’s pure theory of law has taken
us thus far: the idea that underlying all legal obligations
whatsoever – including those created by agreement,
or political recognition – is a Grundnorm, or what Hart
would later describe as a rule of recognition.
As we shall now see, this idea, at least in Kelsen’s
justification for it, adds nothing that is not already
implicit in the way law is ordinarily conceived by persons
in their practical capacity as legal subjects. Furthermore,
as a foundational principle, it misrepresents the
circular nature of legal authorization as Kelsen
himself understands it, thereby obscuring his later
acknowledgement that the practical, if not conceptual,
boundaries separating political will (and ethical
recognition) from legal norm (and rule of recognition)
are less sharp than he claims they are.
Kelsen introduces the idea of a basic norm
(Grundnorm) to capture two conceptual features of law:
its status as a norm that possesses obligatory force
as distinct from a power-backed command or threat;
and its status as a self-contained system distinct from
other normative systems, such as those emanating
from morality, religion, or self-interest. Let us begin
with this last feature of the basic norm: its provision
1

“The democratic type (of government) has a definite inclination towards
an ideal of pacificism, the autocratic, towards one of imperialism […].
The aim of [a] war [may be the] final establishment of peace through a
world organization which bears all the marks of democracy: a community
of states having equal rights under a mutually agreed tribunal for the
settlement of disputes, if possible a world court, as a first step to the
evolution towards a world state; a notion which is […] of no political
value to an autocratic and imperialistic outlook […]“ (Kelsen 1973
[1933], 106-107).
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of a “rule of recognition” for identifying valid law as a
distinctive system of norms. Here, the basic norm serves
to highlight the hierarchical nature of law, which posits
the constitution as the supreme authority for laying out
the procedures for deciding what constitutes valid law. In
the regressive logic that leads from any action claiming
legal status to the actual determination of its legal
validity, the basic norm says nothing more than that one
“ought to behave according to the actually established
and effective constitution” (Kelsen 1967, 212). Kelsen
underscores the foundational logic underlying this topdown determination – from a limiting set of abstract
constitutional norms to a concrete set of authorized
actions – by appeal to a simple syllogism.
“In the normative syllogism leading to the foundation
of the validity of a legal order, the major premise is the
ought-sentence which states the basic norm: ‘One ought to
behave according to the actually established and effective
constitution’; the minor premise is the is-sentence which
states the facts: ‘The constitution is actually established
and effective’; and the conclusion is the ought-sentence:
‘One ought to behave according to the legal order, that is,
the legal order is valid’” (Kelsen 1967 [1934], 212).

The other function of the basic norm, which we have
already discussed, underscores the fact that laws are not
power-based commands or threats, but are norms or
actions that have been authorized by the norms specified
through the constitution.
“To the question why we ought to obey its [i.e., the
historically first constitution’s] provision a science of
positive law can only answer: the norm that we ought to
obey [its] provisions must be presupposed as a hypothesis
if the coercive order established on its basis and actually
obeyed and applied by those whose behavior it regulates
is to be considered a valid legal order binding on these
individuals; if the relations among these individuals are to be
interpreted as legal duties, legal rights, and legal responsibilities, and
not as mere power relations; and if it shall be possible to distinguish
between what is legally right and legally wrong and especially
between legitimate and illegitimate use of force. This is the basic
norm of a positive legal order, the ultimate reason for its
validity, seen from the point of view of a science of law”
(Kelsen 1957, 262; my emphasis).

Several problems surface when critically examining
the kind of validity that Kelsen here assigns to the
law and how persons subjectively choose to relate to
it. First, as Hart noted (Hart 1991, 230), the idea of a
basic norm appears to be unnecessary, or tautologous,
since it essentially asserts that one ought to fulfill
one’s obligations. In the quote above, the basic norm
is described by Kelsen as a hypothesis stating a logical
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or transcendental condition for the possibility of
relating to an action as lawful: If one is to identify an
action as lawful one must also be able to identify it as
constitutionally valid and further be able to understand
the constitution itself as valid and binding.
As we have seen, Kelsen applies this logic to
international law. Contrary to Hart’s belief that there is
no rule of recognition binding international law – that
treaties are simply temporary agreements of mutual
convenience, dependent on each contracting party’s
voluntary decision to recognize them as such – Kelsen
insists that there is such a rule (basic norm), namely that
agreements ought to be kept, or as Kelsen alternatively
formulates it: “Coercion of state against state ought to
be exercised under the conditions and in a manner that
conforms with the [treaty] customs [legally] constituted
by the actual behavior of states” (Kelsen 1967, 216).
So formulated, the basic norm in both its
international and domestic constitutional formulations
succumbs to Hart’s objection. Taking the basic norm
underlying international law as our example, once one
understands that the conditions and customs in question
specify that states ought to be coerced whenever they fail
to respect their treaty obligations, nothing is gained by
adding further that this ought to be done. Nowhere does
the basic norm add anything more to the meaning of law
than what is already implied by its actual functioning.
At best, this tautology (as Hart puts it) serves to remind
philosophers that the classical positivist reduction of
laws to power-based commands that one finds in Hobbes
and Austin is conceptually mistaken.2 Nor does this
reminder serve to establish Kelsen’s other thesis that the
binding power of law stems from a superordinate rule
of recognition – or international legal constitution – as
distinct from an ethically or prudentially motivated act
of recognition.
Second, related to Hart’s concern that international
treaties are prudential agreements rather than legally
binding contracts, is the status of the basic norm as a
hypothesis. As a hypothesis, or conditional norm, the
basic norm opens up the possibility that one might
simply relate to the law prudentially, as if it were not a
norm, but a mere factual constraint. Hart, for example,
entertains this possibility when he distinguishes the
insider attitude of someone who identifies herself as a
legal subject or practitioner of the law from the outsider
attitude of someone who identifies herself as a strategic
calculator who is concerned only about the beneficial
peace-securing effects that follow from her conforming
to it or, conversely, the punitive effects that might attend
her violating it. Because of its status as a hypothesis,
or conditional belief (attitude), the basic norm appears
2

Even Hitler’s commands were not popularly regarded as mere powerbacked threats (however criminal they were later judged to be) but were
obeyed in accordance with a basic legal norm, the Führerprinzip.

to be merely contingently related to law. Indeed, legal
realists regarded law this way, as if it were nothing more
than a relatively predictable punitive power exercised
by agents of the state. Conversely, natural law theorists
have dismissed the positivist emphasis on law’s
authority in deference to its moral legitimacy. Citizens
sometimes do care more about a law’s justice than its
authority. Therefore, it all boils down to how one chooses
to view the coercive acts of identifiable state agents: as
predictable threats (the outsider view), as authorized
commands (the juristic insider view), or as just norms
(the citizen insider view).
Where does this leave Kelsen’s doctrine of the basic
norm? By 1952, after decades of defending his doctrine,
Kelsen himself expressed doubts about its necessity: “I
have abandoned it seeing that a norm (Sollen) must be
a correlate of a will (Wollen). My basic norm is a fictive
norm based on a fictive act of volition […] In the basic
norm a fictive act of volition is conceived that actually
does not exist” (Kelsen 1952, 119-120). This passage can
be understood as perhaps reiterating Hart’s point that
adopting the normative standpoint of a legal insider is a
matter of choice or decision, so that law’s obligatory force
is not intrinsic to its external identification as a relatively
predictable punitive (or instrumentally efficacious)
power emanating from agents of the state. Likewise,
Kelsen’s steadfast insistence that the basic norm is a
purely cognitive presupposition that has no prescriptive
force can be understood as reiterating Hart’s point
that the basic norm only functions to draw attention to
law’s practical meaning for one who approaches it as a
legal insider (a jurist or citizen). However, it could also
mean that the process of legal authorization is circular,
viz., that constitutions must be interpreted– and, in
turn, reciprocally constituted – by the very acts they
authorize. As we shall now see, this exposes a conceptual
tension between the static and dynamic aspects of
Kelsen’s pure theory of law that renders implausible the
very idea of identifying law through a foundational rule
of (constitutional) recognition.
Conceptual problems surface when we examine
how the basic norm is supposed to function as a rule of
recognition. When viewed from Kelsen’s static (logical
or conceptual) analysis of law, the basic norm tells us
that we must look to the constitution as the supreme
authority for identifying what actions count as valid
law. However, when we turn to Kelsen’s analysis of the
dynamic process of law as a self-contained system of
lawmaking, the hierarchical conception of law, as a
determination proceeding from foundational premise
to application, gives way to a more circular conception.
Key to understanding the dynamic aspect of law ”in
its movement” is the fact that law “regulates its own
creation” through legally authorized acts of legislation
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and adjudication (Kelsen 1957, 245). In this firm rejection
of the mechanical (deductive or deterministic) account of
legal application that was so central to legal formalism,
Kelsen here asserts that the authoritative meaning of the
constitution, which certainly regulates its own creation
through acts of amendment, statutory enactment,
judicial interpretation, and executive application, is
organically connected to the totality of the acts it has
authorized. One must therefore look to these subsidiary,
concrete articulations of the constitution in deciding its
valid meaning as an authorizing procedure.
If the circularity of law’s reflexive genesis is taken
as the fulcrum of Kelsen’s theory of law, then this
suggests another reason for abandoning his doctrine of
the Grundnorm, with all its misleading foundational and
hierarchical aspects (von Bernstorff 2010, 270). It also
suggests that the real contribution of Kelsen’s theory of
law resides in its understanding that the basic human
rights and procedures that constitutions entrench,
do not simply limit what legislatures, judges, and
executive agents can legally do, since these agents also
contribute to the enactment of these very same rights
and procedures.
To conclude, our critical examination of Kelsen’s
defense of a basic norm qua rule of recognition
recommends discarding it as the centerpiece of his legal
philosophy. In its place, we should focus on his circular
account of lawmaking. Doing so, I submit, brings to
the fore an important conceptual relationship between
constitutional rights and democracy that has been much
obscured in our time: the manner in which individual
freedom (rights) and collective self-determination
mutually define and constitute each other. Once we no
longer “read Kelsen’s theory […] as a scientific theory
of pure legal doctrine, but as a practically oriented
theory that anticipates the global revolution of the 20th
Century,” namely, the conjunction of liberal (social) democracy
and international human rights (Brunkhorst 2009, 232),
then the political, recognitive ethos underlying our
subjective duty to respect the law emerges as perhaps
Kelsen’s most important contribution to contemporary
legal theory.

4. Liberal Democracy as a Political Procedure for
Creating a Legislative Will
Let us pause to recollect the path that has led us to now
reconsider Kelsen’s theory of legal obligation as a political,
and not purely legal, theory. We began by noting that
Kelsen appeals to the necessity of political recognition
in authorizing the sovereign rights and duties of agents
(nations and persons) but dismisses the idea that political
recognition as such, at least in its classical formulation
as a mutual agreement among already sovereign
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subjects, is coherent; for, the contracting parties are only
bound to do whatever each of them wants to do. In the
case of international law, for example, the very concept
of national sovereignty, or unlimited national selfdetermination, entails a dialectical logic that leads to the
effacement of independent sovereign nations. In lieu of
political recognition as the ground of legal authority,
Kelsen appeals to an entirely different kind of founding
recognition: a basic norm that provides a logical rule
of recognition for identifying and authorizing legal
obligations. However, as we have just seen, such an
objective notion of recognition is arguably vacuous and
even unnecessary on Kelsen’s own account, and for two
reasons. First, it adds nothing to our understanding of
what it means to be in a legal relationship (which by
definition imposes obligations); and second, a choice
must be made to subjectively recognize oneself as being
in such a relationship, in which the coercive acts of the
state are to be regarded as binding (valid), as distinct
from merely compulsory.
Finally, the idea of a rule of recognition is misleading
insofar as it seems to posit a constitution as a welldefined norm for limiting and authorizing subsequent
legal acts. Such a foundational, hierarchical view of
law inadequately acknowledges the role subsequent
legal acts play in interpreting, defining and delimiting
law’s own constitutional meaning and authority. In this
sense, Kelsen’s revealing assertion that the basic norm is
a ‘fictive’ norm that necessarily incorporates a moment
of subjective willing suggests that, in the final analysis,
Kelsen’s own distinction between will and norm,
subjective (psychological) and objective (conceptual)
grounds of obligation, and political and conceptual
modes of recognition breaks down.
Once we accept that a pure theory of legal obligation
cannot be self-standing but requires supplementation
from political theory, it becomes imperative to ask
what kind of political system in our modern age is most
likely to secure the psychological motivation most likely
to encourage an ethical, as opposed to a purely selfinterested (or instrumental) respect for the law. The
question is important because only the former kind of
respect (of law’s justice and goodness) is likely to secure
the enduring voluntary compliance of subjects to the
law.
As is well known, when it came to rational and
effective sources of legal order, Kelsen never concealed
his preference for clear, flexible constitutional norms
over vague metaphysical notions of national will and
identity. Among constitutional regimes, he always
upheld liberal democracy as most conducive to
achieving that order, at least in a modern, enlightened
world. Leaving aside his own commitment to valuefree political science, his description of an ideal type
of liberal democracy, understood as a distinctive
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conjoining of individual liberties and political rights,
points us to a set of psychological dispositions, or
recognitive ethical expectations, that citizens of such a
democracy generally have, if they are to retain faith in
the validity, or legitimacy, of the political process that
generates their rights and duties.
Kelsen’s scattered writings on democracy show his
indebtedness to Weber’s sociology of law. For Weber,
democracy marks the logical political corollary to a
modern, rational type of legal order. Such an order
endows legal subjects with basic individual rights,
which, in turn, express a distinctly modern ethos of
individualism that he believed evolved in Northern
Europe during the late Middle Ages, specifically in
conjunction with the Protestant Reformation. Thanks to
secularization and the spread of rational and scientific
attitudes toward self, society, and nature, ethical life
has split off from public morality and has become a
sphere of private moral conscience and, subsequently,
of responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions
as these impact others as well as oneself.
As the supreme coordinating mechanism in an
ethically polarized world of free subjects, law must
be voluntarily accepted by those whose behavior it
constrains. However, not only must they be responsible
for respecting the law, but they must also be responsible
for making the law. In other words, legal subjects will
obey the law responsibly only if they generally find that
its coercive effects are conducive toward the satisfaction
of their ends; and this means that the binding authority
of law – its legitimacy and efficacy – depends on the
law advancing the interests and ethical values of the
people whose behavior it constrains. This condition is
most likely to be obtained only in a democracy wherein
the people themselves have taken direct or indirect
responsibility for lawmaking.
In common parlance, democracy is simply the
principle that the people must be consulted, either
through direct plebiscite or indirect election of
lawmakers, to ensure that the law reflects the will of
the majority. Most important from our (and Kelsen’s)
perspective (and in contrast to Schmitt’s) is that the will
of the majority doesn’t precede and pre-determine the
law, as if there already existed a homogeneous “will of
the people.” Rather, the will of the majority first comes
into existence as a result of a democratic procedure. To
cite Kelsen’s early essay on democracy:

The key idea expressed in the above passage is that a
political will must be created out of an aggregate of
conflicting wills through a process of “integration.” This
understanding of democracy goes against the simple
view of democracy as a procedure for weighing and
ranking preferences through a counting of votes. If
what we mean by democracy is nothing more than the
aggregation of preferences, then democracy cannot
function as a true decision procedure for lawmaking
because a dominant preference – assuming one could
emerge that would avoid familiar paradoxes associated
with collective choice cycling – would fall short of what
we mean by a majority will.
In order for democracy to function as a procedure for
integrating conflicting preferences into a majority will
– not to mention a “people’s will” or a popular mandate
– it must also facilitate critical public deliberation on
the opportunity costs associated with our preferences.
This deliberative understanding of democracy is
clearly articulated in Kelsen’s later essay on democracy:
“Because the permanent tension between majority and
minority, government and opposition, results in the
dialectical process so characteristic of the democratic
formation of the will of the state, one rightly may say:
democracy is discussion” (Kelsen 1955, 25-26; my emphasis).
Assuming that Kelsen is correct that discussion is
necessary for the democratic integration of conflicting
preferences into a dominant majority will, we must ask
how much integration is needed to constitute such a will.
Here, Kelsen rejects the idea that integration entails
anything like a consensus on generalizable interests, or
a general will. As he puts it, “the content of [democratic]
legal order may be a compromise” that balances
particular interests (Kelsen 1955, 28). Beyond having
one’s interests included in a political compromise,
which might not always happen in the short term, there
remains another kind of political integration that is
perhaps most essential to democracy: political agreement
on the approximate fairness of the democratic process sufficient
to generate acceptance of the outcome.
Here, Kelsen reminds us that modern democracy only
functions to integrate the minority into the majority so
long as it constitutionally entrenches a foundational
principle of liberalism:

“Here precisely resides a decisive advantage of democracy
and its majoritarian principle, that it nonetheless
secures by means of the simplest organization a certain
political integration of a society legally regulated by a state
(Staatsgesellschaft) […] That the ’will of the state’ created
juristically is supposedly the ‘will of the people’ is thus
itself a fiction – albeit a fiction closest to reality – so long

“Modern democracy cannot be separated from political
liberalism. Its principle is that the government must not
interfere with certain spheres of interest of the individual,
which are to be protected by law as fundamental human
rights or freedoms. It is by the respect of these rights
that minorities are safeguarded against arbitrary rule by
majorities” (Kelsen 1955, 28).

as the procedure for creating the will is democratically organized”
(Kelsen 1920b, 28; my emphasis).
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The compliance of minorities with democratic majority
rule depends on their being protected from majoritarian
tyranny through their secure exercise of basic,
constitutionally entrenched rights. However, as we have
seen, given that Kelsen’s circular account of lawmaking
and legal authorization entails that the concrete
prescriptive content of rights must be interpreted and
legislated by those in power, constitutional norms do
not provide an absolute barrier to majoritarian tyranny.
One way to avoid milder forms of tyranny (recalling
the connection between political self-determination
and deliberation) is to “include in our definition the
idea that the social order […] in order to be democratic,
must guarantee certain intellectual freedoms, such as
freedom of conscience, freedom of press, etc.” (Kelsen
1955, 4). Without the protection of dissenting voices, the
discussions necessary for generating an autonomous
political will would be incapable of integrating groups
of widely opposed interests and ideologies. A more
ambitious way to include minority voices in the
deliberative process, Kelsen suggests, is to guarantee
minority representation in government itself. That
said, purely legal remedies along these lines will likely
not succeed in fairly incorporating minority opinions
into the process of political will formation unless they
are accompanied by an ethos of civility that motivates
political actors – along several dimensions of mutual
recognition – to refrain from imposing their private
wills on their fellow compatriots imperialistically.

5. The Politics of Recognition in Kelsen’s Account
of Democracy
The reluctance of political actors to impose their will
tyrannically, I argue, requires that politicians and citizens
mutually recognize each other as persons meriting equal
moral respect. According to Kelsen, this “feeling for
equality” presupposes “that all individuals are of equal
political value and that everyone has the same claim to
freedom […] and recognizes himself in the other” (Kelsen 1955,
25-26; my emphasis). One manifestation of this kind
of recognition is the respect shown to fellow political
interlocutors who enjoy fundamental human rights
to speak, associate, and disseminate public opinion.
Here the accent is on recognition of each person’s moral
autonomy.
Another manifestation of mutual recognition is
on reciprocity. In recognizing oneself in the other, one
recognizes common interests and ends that can (indeed
must) be furthered through cooperation. At the very
least, consociates must collaborate in speaking to one
another, influencing one another, and shaping opinions
that will form part of the wider public discussion
regarding justice and welfare, as well as shape policies
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impacting the scope of their freedom. This notion of
reciprocity – of proposing just and beneficial forms of
social cooperation – brings us back to the idea of political
society as a social contract. It emphasizes the ethical
duty of citizens in a democracy to join in solidarity in
the pursuit of securing their common welfare in a just
manner. Without civic solidarity, democratic life is
ill equipped to withstand legally permitted forms of
majoritarian tyranny.
Solidarity may or may not entail a willingness on the
part of those so conjoined to make reasonable sacrifices.
Citizens are nonetheless called upon to sacrifice some
of their freedoms for the common good during national
emergencies and they are called upon to sacrifice some
of their wealth in guaranteeing that those among them
who are worst off can enjoy roughly equal opportunities
to exercise political and civil freedom through accessing
provisions of health, education, and welfare. Hence,
Kelsen notes that the citizen of a democracy “represents
the altruistic type, for he [sic] does not experience the
other as an enemy but is inclined to see in his fellow
man his friend” (Kelsen 1955, 26; emphasis added). With
Schmitt’s definition of the political as an antagonism
between friend and foe no doubt in the back of his
mind, Kelsen here maintains that citizens of a liberal
democracy are ethically committed to recognizing each
other as friends who care for each other. Just as parents
seek to instill confidence in their children so that they
can express their individuality, so too citizens of a
democracy are willing to make altruistic sacrifices for
the sake of enabling each member of society to become
fully autonomous agents who confidently express their
individual opinions.
Finally, Kelsen observes that citizens of a democracy
are predisposed to resolving their differences through
peaceful means, through the force of reason, impartial
evidence, and critical reflection on their own fallibility
and the opportunity costs imposed on others by singleminded pursuit of their own interests.
“Because [democracy] guarantees internal peace, it is
preferred by the peace-loving, non-aggressive type […] [T]
he respect for science corresponds perfectly to that kind of
person which we have described as specifically democratic.
In the great dilemma of volition and cognition, between the
wish to dominate the world and that to understand it, the
pendulum swings more in the direction of cognition than
volition […] because with this type of character the will to
power, the intensity of ego experience, is relatively reduced
and self-criticism relatively strengthened” (Kelsen 1955,
28).

The above citation reaffirms the importance of
recognizing what John Rawls in Political Liberalism
describes as “reasonable pluralism” and the “burdens
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of judgement” in conducting oneself with civility in
democratic deliberation (Rawls 1993, 58-66; Vinx 2007).
Knowledge of the reasonableness of strong differences
of opinion in a free society, viz. moral and cognitive/
epistemic relativism, counsels that one regard one’s
interests and deeply held convictions from the standpoint
of others. Recognizing that others – whose reasonable
interests conflict with one’s own, and whose identities
have been shaped by different comprehensive cultural
worldviews than one’s own – might not be rationally
persuaded to embrace one’s own interests and
convictions, obligates us to refrain from tyrannically
imposing these interests and convictions in the course
of our political deliberations and voting conduct.
To conclude, Kelsen’s understanding of liberal
democracy as a deliberative procedure of lawmaking
invokes an ethical conception of mutual recognition
as a precondition for the subjectively binding force
(legitimacy) of objectively recognized laws. Although
Kelsen clearly endorses this ethos, he does so indirectly,
by endorsing a corresponding democratic ideal, which
he believes is most conducive to securing lawful peace
and order in our times. As he describes it, the recognitive
expectations of democracy are not chosen or agreed
upon so much as given in the enabling conditions for the
kind of deliberative democratic practice he highlights.
Indeed, these expectations – to recognize fellow
deliberative consociates as equal possessors of human
rights, as collaborators in a joint venture oriented
toward their mutual benefit, as peace-loving critics of
their own fallible understanding, and as friends who
care about each other and are willing to make sacrifices
on their behalf if need be – might well be built into our
basic competence as beings who mutually understand
and affirm each other, cooperate together, and resolve
differences peacefully through critical discussion
(Habermas 1987, 1996).

6. Summary
I have argued that Kelsen’s legal thought deserves serious
consideration in contemporary discussions about
the ethics and politics of recognition. Given Kelsen’s
explicit objection to recognition-based accounts of
legal authority, this conclusion might seem surprising.
However, my examination of Kelsen’s legal thought
broadly construed has revealed that recognition is key to
his defense of liberal democracy, which he singles out as
the political system that is most conducive to supporting
a stable rule of law in the modern era. Furthermore, I
have sought to show that other, non-ethical modalities
of recognition – the prudential and the conceptual –
figure predominantly in Kelsen’s legal philosophy as
well.

The conceptual/legal modality that is associated
with Kelsen’s pure theory of law designates a rule
of recognition for recognizing an action as lawful in
accordance with a self-contained, hierarchical system of
legal norms. I have argued that this kind of conceptual
recognition, which bears little, if any, resemblance to
ethico-political modalities of intersubjective recognition,
should not merit the central role in his legal theory that
Kelsen sometimes assigned it. Once we accept Kelsen’s
own misgivings about this purely conceptual idea of
recognition, especially in light of his analysis of the
circular dynamic informing lawmaking at all levels, we
are better off focusing our attention on his discussion
of two other, distinctly ethical-political, modalities of
recognition.
The first ethico-political modality of recognition we
examined is associated with purely prudential accounts
of social contractarian justifications for normative
authority. It consists of each party recognizing that its
interests converge with the interests of other parties,
and then agreeing to conditions for mutually satisfying
them. As illustrated in Kelsen’s early writings on national
sovereignty and international law, governments
are recognized by other governments as rightfully
exercising a monopoly of violence in pursuit of their
interests, so long as they do so effectively and within the
constraints (territorial and otherwise) agreed upon by
the international community. According to prudential
social contractarian reasoning, governments recognize
these constraints solely out of national self-interest, with
each reserving an absolute sovereign “right” to break
the agreement should its own strategic calculations so
dictate. International peace and cooperation cannot
be founded on this kind of fragile agreement, which
is inherently vulnerable to violent overthrow by any
party that has the power and will to do so. In place of
this prudential model of recognition, whose implicit
logic inclines toward solipsism and imperialism, Kelsen
recommends a second ethical modality of recognition
of a kind he associates with a peace-loving democratic
federation.
The ethical modality of recognition thus emerges
as a democratic corrective (or supplement) to the
impasses found in Kelsen’s discussion of conceptual
and prudential modalities of recognition. For Kelsen,
liberal democracy presents a model of political order
in which the rights (limited sovereignty) of all parties
to the social contract are legally protected. Kelsen
adds that the various legal mechanisms by which
democracies integrate the dissident wills of minorities
into majoritarian legislation succeed in promoting a
peaceful rule of law only to the degree that they also
embody an ethos of civility. I have argued that this ethos
can be understood as an ethics of recognition along
four dimensions highlighted by Kelsen: recognition of
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fellow citizens as autonomous moral agents, as parties
to a scheme of cooperation engaged in a solidaristic and
reciprocal sharing of burdens and benefits, as friends
whose welfare calls forth duties of care, and as bearers
of distinctive cultural identities, social perspectives, and
political interests that merit respect when reasonably
cultivated in critical discussion.
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